The Supreme Court Further Defines the Parameters of the Americans with Disabilities Act

By: ANNE M. RADOLINSKI

December 2002

The United States Supreme Court has issued a number of decisions this year that clarify, and many would argue significantly narrow, coverage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA or the Act).

In the first decision, long awaited by the defense bar, the Court detailed the threshold standards for establishing a disability, ruling that the Court of Appeals had applied the wrong standard in evaluating whether an individual's carpal tunnel condition was a disability under the Act. (See Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 122 S.Ct. 681 (2002).) The Court's decision clarified that, in order to invoke the protections of the ADA, an individual must prove that he or she has a physical or mental impairment that "prevents or severely restricts the individual from engaging in activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives," and that the impairment's impact is permanent or long-term.

The Supreme Court emphasized that it is insufficient for individuals to simply provide a medical diagnosis. They must show that the limitation caused by their impairment is substantial. The label that an individual or an individual's treating health professional puts on an impairment is not controlling. The courts must perform an individualized assessment to determine whether the impairment, for that particular individual, is permanent or long-term and prevents or severely restricts the individual from engaging in activities of central importance to daily life. This is especially true with impairments such as carpal tunnel whose symptoms vary widely.

The Supreme Court, in a subsequent decision issued in June 2002, ruled that an employer may refuse a requested accommodation that runs afoul of an established seniority system. (See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S.Ct. 1516 (2002).) A cargo handler for U.S. Airways, Barnett, had transferred to a less physically demanding mailroom position after injuring his back. That position was later opened to bidding under the airline's seniority system and more senior employees bid on the job. US Airways refused to accommodate Barnett's request to allow him to remain in the position despite the seniority system, and Barnett lost his job.

The Supreme Court refused to reject the airline's defense out of hand, noting that a "typical seniority system provides important employee benefits by creating, and fulfilling employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment - e.g., job security and an opportunity for steady and predictable advancement based on objective standards - that might be undermined if an employer were required to show more than the system's existence." An individual who has been denied an accommodation based on a seniority system, has the opportunity to show special circumstances that warrant a finding that, despite the seniority system, the request was a reasonable accommodation.

The Supreme Court, in a second opinion issued in June 2002, clarified that an employer may, consistent with the ADA, refuse to hire an individual because performance of the job would affect the individual's health. (See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S.Ct. 2045 (2002).) Echazabal had twice applied for positions at a Chevron oil refinery. In each instance, Chevron extended an offer of employment contingent on passing the company's physical examination. The offers were each withdrawn when Chevron's doctors said Echazabal had a liver abnormality that would be aggravated by continued exposure to toxins at the refinery. Chevron defended its actions under an EEOC regulation that provided a defense where an individual's disability would pose a direct threat to the individual's health on the job. (See 29 CFR ¤ 1630.15(b)(2) 2001.) The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the EEOC regulation and Chevron's actions in rejecting Echazabal for the positions.

The Supreme Court has provided a clear message in these recent cases that it will interpret the ADA consistent with Congress' original intent - to protect otherwise qualified individuals with substantially limiting, long-term impairments from discriminatory practices. As the Court explained in Toyota Motor, Congress, in enacting the ADA in 1990, recognized that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities." The Supreme Court continued that "[i]f Congress had intended everyone with a physical impairment that precluded the performance of some isolated, unimportant, or particularly difficult manual task to qualify as disabled, the number of disabled Americans would surely have been much higher." Since the passage of the ADA, courts and agencies have been deluged with cases involving temporary impairments or impairments that could not be viewed to substantially limit an individual's major life activities, such as certain back problems, eye sight issues, carpal tunnel, weight conditions, stress, anxiety, and minor mental health issues. They have also been inundated with claims involving requested accommodations beyond those contemplated by the Act. It is anticipated that Toyota Motor and subsequent decisions will begin to clear the courts and agencies of such lawsuits and claims. As statutory and regulatory interpretations remain complex and seemingly contradictory, however, employers, third-party administrators, and insurers are advised to seek guidance in handling issues involving the ADA or state and local laws prohibiting disability discrimination.