

STATE OF MINNESOTA
COUNTY OF HENNEPIN

DISTRICT COURT
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

EDINA COMMUNITY LUTHERAN
CHURCH AND UNITY CHURCH OF
SAINT PAUL,

Plaintiffs

Court File No. MC 05-011659

ORDER

STATE OF MINNESOTA,
Defendant

FILED
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DEPUTY
HENN CO. DISTRICT
COURT ADMINISTRATOR

The above-entitled matter has come before the Honorable LaJune Thomas Lange of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Hennepin County Government Center, Minneapolis, Minnesota on Plaintiffs', Edina Community Lutheran Church ("Edina") and Unity Church of St. Paul ("Unity"), Motion for a Temporary Injunction. Plaintiffs have challenged the constitutionality of portions of the Minnesota Citizens' Personal Protection Act of 2003 ("2003 Act")¹ as reenacted and amended by the 2005 Minnesota Legislature, Act of May 24, 2005, ch. 83, 2005 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 315 (West) ("2005 Act"). Plaintiffs have brought the action against the State of Minnesota ("State"). For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary injunction is granted.

APPEARANCES

David Lillehaug, Esq. and Marshall Tanick, Esq. appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs. Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant Attorney General appeared on behalf of the State of Minnesota.

Therefore, this Court, based upon the files, records and affidavit of counsel, herein, hereby makes the following:

¹ For the purposes of this memorandum, the term "2003 Act" refers to Article 2 of the Act of April 28, 2003, ch. 28, 2003 Minn. Laws 265, 272 ("2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28")

FINDING OF FACTS

I. THE 2003 ACT.

In 2003, the Legislature enacted and the Governor signed into law 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28, which contained the Minnesota Citizens' Personal Protection Act (the 2003 Act). The 2003 Act became law after receiving a bipartisan majority of both the Minnesota Senate and House of Representatives. The 2003 Act amended some existing laws relating to the permitting of the possession of firearms, including Minn. Stat. §624.714, and added some new provisions to section 624.714 applicable to "private establishments" and employers relating to prohibition of firearms on private property. *See* Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subds. 17 and 18 (2004). The 2003 Act was reenacted in 2005 (with some modifications). *See* the 2005 Act, Act of May 24, 2005, ch. 83, 2005 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 315 (West).

Under the Act, persons who are at least 21 years of age, are citizens or permanent residents of the United States, have training in the safe use of a pistol, complete an application, and are not otherwise disqualified from possessing a firearm may apply for a permit. Before a permit is issued, sheriffs must conduct background checks of applicants and notify the police chief where the applicant resides, who may provide the sheriff with relevant information. *See* Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 4 (2004). Sheriffs may deny a permit if there is a substantial likelihood the applicant is a danger to himself or the public. *See id.*, subd. 6. Sheriffs may not issue permits to ineligible persons. Article 3 of 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28 imposes a lifetime ban on violent felons from possessing firearms. Under prior law, the ban only lasted ten years from the date of conviction. *See* Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1a (2002). In addition, persons who have been found incompetent to stand trial, have been committed as mentally or chemically dependent, and who have been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces, among others, are ineligible to apply for permit. *See* Minn. Stat. § 624.713 (2004).

In May 2003, Edina and other parties filed suit in Hennepin County. *Edina Community Lutheran Church, et al. v. State of Minnesota*, Hennepin County Court File No. MC 03-008185 (“Edina 1”). On June 6, 2003, the Honorable Marilyn Rosenbaum granted a request for temporary injunctive relief as to the “reasonable request” aspect of the 2003 Act, finding a likelihood of success on the merits of Plaintiffs’ “freedom of conscience” claim under Minn. Const. Art. 1, § 16. On remand from an intermediate appeal, the district court broadened its grant of temporary relief. See Order dated March 16, 2004, *Lillehaug Aff., Ex. D.* After the 2005 Act was signed into law, the Plaintiffs dismissed Edina 1.

In October 2003, Unity and other parties filed suit in Ramsey County. *Unity Church of St. Paul, et al. v. State of Minnesota*, Ramsey County Court File no. C9-03-9570 (“Unity I”). On July 14, 2004, the Honorable John T. Finley granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and declared the 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28 was unconstitutional because the law embraced more than one subject. The Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Finley’s ruling based on the “single-subject” rule. *Unity Church of St. Paul v. State*, 694 N.W. 2d 585 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005). The court, however, did not decide the religious freedom issue raised in Ramsey County District Court.

II. THE 2005 ACT.

Less than six weeks after the Court of Appeals’ decision, the Legislature enacted (on a bipartisan basis) and the Governor signed into law the 2005 Act. The 2005 Act reenacts Articles 2 and 3 of chapter 28 of the 2004 Minnesota Session Laws, effective retroactively and without interruption from April 28, 2003. The 2005 Act also amended the 2003 Act concerning the manner in which establishments may deliver notice that handguns are banned. In the 2005 Act, the Legislature defined a “reasonable request” for the purposes of banning handguns in an establishment as follows:

As used in this subdivision, the terms in this paragraph have the meanings given:

(1) "Reasonable request" means a request made under the following circumstances:

- (i) the requester has prominently posted a conspicuous sign at every entrance to the establishment containing the following language "(INDICATE IDENTITY OF OPERATOR) BANS GUNS IN THESE PREMISES";
and or
- (ii) the requester or ~~it's~~ the requester's agent personally informs the person of ~~the posted request~~ that guns are prohibited in the premises and demands compliance.

Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 17(b)(1).

MEMORANDUM

The granting of a temporary injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy intended to preserve the status quo pending an adjudication on the merits. See *Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n v. Minn. Twins P'ship*, 638 N.W.2d 214, 220 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), *rev. denied* (Minn. Feb. 4, 2002). Because the "injunctive process is the strong arm of equity," the trial court must exercise "[g]reat caution and deliberation" in deciding whether to grant temporary injunctive relief. *AMF Pinspotters, Inc. v. Harkins Bowling, Inc.* 110 N.W.2d 384, 351 (Minn. 1961).

In determining whether to grant an injunction, the Court must apply the factors in *Dahlberg Bros. Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.*, 137 N.W.2d 314, 321-22 (Minn. 1965). These factors are:

- 1) the relationship of the parties;
- 2) the relative harm to the parties if the injunction is or is not granted;
- 3) the likelihood of success on the merits

- 4) the public policies expressed in the statutes;
- 5) the administrative burdens in supervising and enforcing the decree.

Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n, 638 N.W.2d at 220-21 (citing *Dahlberg*). The Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that there is no adequate remedy at law and that an injunction is necessary to prevent great and irreparable harm. *Dahlberg*, 137 N.W.2d at 321-22.

I. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF THEIR CLAIMS.

Plaintiffs base this motion on Count one of their Complaint (i.e., their claim that the 2005 Act violates Article 1, § 16 of the Minnesota Constitution by controlling and interfering with their rights of conscience and burdening the exercise of their religious beliefs.) Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of this claim.

Minnesota Statutes are presumed constitutional, and the power to declare a statute unconstitutional should be exercised with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary. *Associated Builders and Contractors v. Ventura*, 610 N.W.2d 293, 298-99 (Minn. 2000); *In re Haggerty*, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989); *State v. Merrill*, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn.), *cert. denied*, 496 U.S. 931 (1990). Because the constitutionality of a statute is a legal question, lower courts' decisions are given no deference. *Estate of Jones by Blume v. Kvamme*, 529 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Minn. 1995). The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of demonstrating constitutional infirmity beyond a reasonable doubt. *Id.*; *Merrill*, 450 N.W.2d at 321. The 2005 Act impermissibly intrudes into the free exercise of religion by arbitrary definitions, which dictate restrictions on the use of church property for worship, childcare, parking, and rental space. These definitions require the Plaintiffs to explore the conscience and explain the motives of anyone who seeks to gather on church property.

Article 1, § 16 of the Minnesota Constitution, entitled “Freedom Of Conscience; No Preference To Be Given To Any Religious Establishment Or Mode Of Worship” (“Freedom of Conscience Clause”) provides:

The enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not deny or impair others retained by and inherent in the people. The right of every man to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any man be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any religious or ecclesiastical ministry, or against his consent; nor shall any control of or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state, nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious societies or religious or theological seminaries.

The Freedom of Conscience Clause requires that the court weigh “the competing interests at stake whenever rights of conscience are burdened.” *State by Cooper v. French*, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn. 1990). Minnesota Supreme Court analyzes Freedom of Conscience claims under the “compelling state interest balancing test.” *Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High School*, 487 N.W.2d 857, 865 (Minn. 1992). The test has four parts: (1) Is the objector’s belief sincerely held? (2) Does the 2005 Act burden the exercise of religious beliefs? (3) Does the 2005 Act advance interests of the state which are overriding or compelling? and (4) Does the 2005 Act use the least restrictive means to accomplish its purpose? Application of the facts to these factors reveals that the 2005 does violate Article 1, § 16.

A. The Religious Beliefs Of Plaintiffs.

The first prong of the *Hill-Murray* test is whether Plaintiffs’ beliefs are sincerely held. *Id.* While the State does not challenged for purposes of this preliminary injunction motion the sincerity of Plaintiffs’ beliefs as set forth in the Complaint, the nature of those beliefs and the weight of the Act’s burden on them are relevant.

The merits of Plaintiffs' claims are evident when compared to those at issue in *State v. Herschberger*, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1989) ("*Herschberger II*").² In *Herschberger II*, the Old Order Amish contended that a Minnesota statute requiring a moving vehicle to display a fluorescent orange red triangular sign when using state highways contravened their religious beliefs. To the Amish in that case, displaying these triangles would

Compromise their belief that the "loud" colors required and the "worldly symbols" the triangular shapes represent to them [would] conflict with the admonitions found in the Apostle Paul's Epistle. To them to do so would be putting their faith in "worldly symbols" rather than in God.

Herschberger I, 444 N.W.2d at 284.

In *Herschberger II*, the religious beliefs prohibit compliance with the law. In this case, Plaintiffs have sincerely held religious beliefs, which are manifested through worship services, prayer, religious observances and specific ministries. The 2005 Act allows religious organizations to ban guns in under some circumstances if they provide reasonable notice that they are doing so. The 2005 Act further requires that the possession of firearms be allowed in a limited category of places, daycare centers when children are not present for day care purposes, parking areas and tenant space. Plaintiffs were not required to formally prohibit firearms on their property until May 2003, soon after the 2003 Act was signed into law. Plaintiffs should not have to explain to the State the motives and beliefs of persons who gather on church property nor should they be put in a position of being forced to allow guns on church property against religious beliefs because the State has made exceptions based solely on the purpose of the visit rather than a neutral compelling state interest.

B. Plaintiffs Have Demonstrated An Undue Burden On Their Free Exercise Of Religion By Operation Of The 2005 Act.

² The facts underlying the decision in *Herschberger II* are reported in *State v. Herschberger*, 444 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. 1989) ("*Herschberger I*"), judgment vacated, 495 U.S. 901 (1990), on remand, 462 N.W. 393 (Minn. 1990) (*Herschberger II*).

The initial burden of proof in free exercise cases is upon the plaintiff to demonstrate a burden upon religion. See *School Dist. v. Schempp*, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (“Hence it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion.”) To be recognized as a constitutional infringement, the burden on religious beliefs must be substantial. See *Hernandez v. C.I.R.*, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (stating the “free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice”): see also *Hill-Murray*, 487 N.W.2d at 866 (“While *Hill-Murray* may have demonstrated that the application of MLRA interferes with their authority as an employer, they have not established that this minimal interference excessively burdens their religious beliefs.”). Plaintiffs have shown undue or excessive burden.

Plaintiffs show that the 2005 Act imposes four “burdens” on their freedom of conscience: (1) a burden on their rights to communicate and worship as they see fit, due to the existence of the two alternative “reasonable request” options in Section 9 of the 2005 Act (amending Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd 17);³ (2) a burden on their right to use their real property for worship and religious mission, given the 2005 Act’s prohibition on banning firearms in parking areas, tenant rental space and daycare centers when children are not present for daycare purposes. (3) a burden on their religious rights as employers, given the 2005 Act’s provision prohibiting them from banning employees from possession of firearms in Plaintiffs’ parking areas;⁴ and (4) a burden on their right to use their property for worship and religious mission, given the 2005 Act’s inconsistent provisions prohibiting them, as landlords, from restricting the possession of firearms by their tenants, guests, worshippers, visitors and others based upon their purpose, motive or conscious articulation as to whether their presence on church property fails under an

³ See Minn. Stat. § 624.714 subd 17(b)(2004), as amended and quoted supra at 4

⁴ See Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd 18(c) (2004).

exemption provided by the 2005 Act.⁵ Taken in totality, these burdens warrant an exemption from the 2005 Act.

1. The “reasonable request” options of the 2005 Act burdens Plaintiffs’ right to communicate and worship.

The 2005 Act provides that a person who carries a firearm into a private establishment knowing that the operator has made a “reasonable request” not to do so may be “ordered to leave the premises.” Failure to comply is a petty misdemeanor. See Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 17(a), as amended). The 2005 Act amended the “reasonable request” requirement in the 2003 Act to allow two alternative options for making the request: 1) posting signs, with specified verbiage and format requirements, at all building entrances; or 2) personally notifying a person that guns are prohibited on the premises and demanding compliance. Plaintiffs claim that either option prevents them from communication and worshipping “as they see fit.”

First, in the sign-posting option, the 2005 Act requires specific language. Unlike exit signs and parking spaces for disabled individuals, the impact appreciation of the ban varies according to the motives or purpose of the reader. In addition, the new sign posting option requires Plaintiffs to change all signs to include specific words required by the State. For example, Edina has posted a sign that reads: “Blessed are the peacemakers. Firearms are prohibited in this place of sanctuary.” These signs do not comply with the 2005 Act, which requires that the sign “contain” the precise words. Therefore Plaintiffs are constrained from communicating as they see fit with members, visitors, employees, and others.

Statutes should be construed in a manner that avoids constitutional questions. *Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Associates*, 241 N.W.2d 799, 801 (Minn. 1976). See also *Schumann v. Comm’r of Taxation*, 253 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Minn. 1977) (if language of statute can

⁵ See Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 17(e) (2004).

be give two constructions, one constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the court must adopt the constitutional one, even if the constitutional one is less natural).

The 2005 Act provides that the “reasonable request” required by the statute may at the requester’s option be satisfied if the requester personally informs the person of the ban on guns and demands compliance. Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 17(b)(2) as amended and reenacted by the 2005 Act. It requires Plaintiffs to probe the conscience of each person to determine whether by act or motive they fall within an exception carved out by the 2005 Act. The notification must be “personal,” to ensure receipt by the individual, this unduly restricts Plaintiffs’ ability to effectively communicate as they see fit with their members, guests, and others who enter the church property.

2. The prohibition on banning firearms in parking areas burdens Plaintiffs’ rights

Plaintiffs claim that the prohibition on banning firearms in parking areas (including firearms in possession of Plaintiffs’ employees) burdens their right to use their real property for worship and religious freedom. Plaintiffs, consider the church buildings, parking areas and surrounding areas to be integral consecrated spaces dedicated to the furtherance of the ministry of the fellowship of believers that form the church. The State seeks to require the Plaintiffs to ascertain the motives or purpose of each person using the parking lot to determine whether or not an active religious activity is occurring. Under the states rational a church employee who stops to pray in his car before work would be subject to the gun ban while the employee who reads the newspaper in his car can carry a gun into the parking lot. The State requirement that the activity in the parking lot triggers the gun ban is an unconstitutional effort to direct the mode and manner of worship.

3. The provision prohibiting landlords from restricting the possession of firearms by their tenants burdens Plaintiffs' use of their real property for worship and religious mission.

Plaintiffs claim that a burden on their free exercise of conscience results from the provision disallowing landlords from prohibiting possession of firearms by their tenants. Although tenants themselves are entitled to exclude guns from their premises (e.g., child care centers while children are present and participating in a child care program; *see* Minn. Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1d(d)(4)(2)), Plaintiffs are substantially burdened by the 2005 Act's prohibition with respect to that tenant space. As part of its religious mission Plaintiff leases Sunday School classrooms to a licensed child care center. The 2005 Act prohibits guns around children in the church space leased to the childcare center only when children are present for childcare. When the same children are gathered in the same space for Sunday school they have no protection.

Where the courts have found a constitutional violation of religious freedoms, the remedy has been to, in effect, grant a "religious exception." The "religious exception" cases have involved laws that force Plaintiffs to make an unacceptable choice between violating their religious beliefs and suffering civil or criminal penalties, or even suffering financial hardship. *See, eg., Sherbert v. Verner*, 374 U.S. 398, 403-07 (1963) (refusing to make plaintiff choose between not observing her Sabbath day and risking unemployment without state benefits); *Herschberger II* (granting exemption from statute that would require plaintiff to post a slow-moving vehicle sign in violation of deeply held religious beliefs or accept criminal penalties, including fines and jail time.)

Statutory or other exemptions that confer a particular benefit on some organizations or persons for reasons relating to religion risk violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Establishment Clause essentially provides that government "shall make no

law respecting an establishment of religion.” A scheme of exemptions must not “have the purpose or effect of sponsoring certain religious tenets or religious beliefs in general.” *Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock*, 489 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1989) (sales tax exemption for religious periodicals struck down as a blatant endorsement of religion; exemption was not required by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment). The constraints of the federal Establishment Clause must be taken into consideration when a party claims entitlement to a religious exception under a state constitution.

The 2005 Act does require Plaintiffs to alter or to violate their religious beliefs. The 2005 Act requires the Plaintiffs, on church owned property, to associate with persons who carry firearms to their parking lots, leased areas and day care centers when children are not present for day care purposes.

C. No Compelling State Interest In Public Safety And Uniformity Is Established By The 2005 Act As Applied To Religious Institutions.

Under *Hill-Murray*, the Court must determine whether a compelling state interest supports the 2005 Act. The State’s compelling interests, as cited in its brief are the safety of its citizens and allowing its citizens to be protected against violent crimes. The 2005 Act declares that the state has a compelling interest as follows:

The legislature of the State of Minnesota recognizes and declares that the Second Amendment to the United State Constitution guarantees the fundamental, individual right to keep and bear arms. The provisions of this section are declared to be necessary to accomplish compelling state interests in regulation of those rights.

Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 22 (2004) (as reenacted in the 2005 Act.)

Indeed, compelling state interests other than public safety and preventing licentiousness have been held to overcome an individual’s freedom of conscience claim. See, eg., *Hill-Murray*, 487 N.W.2d at 866 (concluding that the state’s interest in safeguarding the rights of labor negotiations free from oversight); *State by McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc.*, 370 N.W.2d

844, 853 (Minn. 1985) (finding compelling interest in prohibiting discrimination in employment and public accommodations, so as to override employer's religious-based objections to human rights act); *Murphy v. Murphy*, 574 N.W.2d 77, 82 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (acknowledging state's compelling interest in assuring parents provide primary support for their children and remanding for development of the record on availability of means less restrictive than imputing income to father who self-limited income for religious reasons).

The State claims a compelling interest in both portions of the 2005 Act challenged by Plaintiffs, i.e., (1) the "reasonable request" provisions of Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 17(b) (as reenacted by the 2005 Act) and (2) the provisions disallowing the prohibition of firearms in parking areas and tenant spaces, Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 17(c) and (e) and subd. 18 (as reenacted by the 2005 Act).

The Legislature adopted parking lot provisions that creates confusion when applied to religious institutions because of the patchwork effect imposed on each parking lot when deciding whether firearms should be allowed or prohibited. Having determined that citizens should be able to protect themselves by carrying a firearm in public, the State has a compelling interest in not unduly restricting where they can travel. An individual with a permitted firearm may wish to travel to or between private establishments that ban firearms. Plaintiffs' facilities are bordered by public parking spaces. A less burdensome option would be to allow persons with guns in their vehicles to park on the street or other permitted areas. The State's interest in allowing individuals to thus protect themselves in this manner strikes a proper balance between the right of a religious institution to ban firearms and the right of an individual to carry a permitted firearm.

D. The 2005 Act Failed To Use The Least Restrictive Available Means To Accomplish The Legislative Purpose.

The third and final question in the *Hill-Murray* test is whether the 2005 Act uses the least restrictive means to accomplish overriding interests. *Hill-Murray*, 487 N.W.2d at 865. This Court finds that the State's objective could be accomplished through less restrictive means by exempting religious organizations from coverage of the statute.

The Legislature determined that when an establishment wishes to ban firearms, it should deliver that message in a clear and understandable manner. This is so that the permit holder is given a fair opportunity to comply with the establishment's policy thus the Legislature specified the verbiage to be used in the sign-posting option in the "reasonable request" provision. Further, the amendments to the "reasonable request" provision in Section 2 of the 2005 Act provide additional leeway for a private establishment that prefers to personally inform the individual of the establishment's prohibition on firearms, rather than post a sign. These amendments remain an impermissible burden on Plaintiffs as religious institutions.

II. THE REMAINING DAHLBERG FACTORS

The remaining applicable *Dahlberg* factors weigh in favor of the injunction in this matter. The first *Dahlberg* factor is the relationship of the parties. Plaintiffs are religious organizations, and the defendant is the State. There is a special relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendant governed by Article I section 16 of the Minnesota Constitution.

The second *Dahlberg* factor is the relative harm to the parties if the injunction is not granted. If the injunction is not granted, Plaintiffs will simply have to comply with the 2005 Act and take actions that are offensive to their core religious beliefs and freedom of conscience.

The next applicable *Dahlberg* factor is public policy expressed in statutes. The law did not exempt religious organizations as it does schools and other types of institutions. Public policy favors freedom of religion as a constitutionally protected right. A failure to protect the Plaintiffs' rights to religious freedom will result in irreparable harm. *See Dahlberg*, 137 N.W.2d at 321-22. As discussed supra at 10-14, Plaintiffs are harmed by the 2005 Act because it requires

them to either violate their religious beliefs or face civil or criminal penalties. There is no administrative burden involved in judicial supervision and enforcement of the temporary decree.


Based on the foregoing, **IT IS ORDERED** that:

1. Plaintiffs' motion for temporary injunctive relief is granted
2. Plaintiffs may prohibit firearms, and provide notice thereof, in any lawful manner, in their houses of worship, in their parking areas (including for employees), in their tenant space (to the extent allowed by lease), and on all of their religious properties
3. The State of Minnesota and its officers, agents, servants, and employees are enjoined from enforcing or attempting to enforce against plaintiffs the provisions of the Reenacted Act that would otherwise bar plaintiffs from prohibiting firearms on their religious properties, or require them to provide notice in any particular manner.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

Dated: 

BY THE COURT:


LaJune Thomas Lange
Judge of District Court