Cook v. Trimble – The Minnesota Court of Appeals Clarifies Standards for UPEPA, Judicial-Proceedings Privilege and Attorney Immunity

Introduction

Litigants and litigators alike will feel the impact of Cook v. Trimble, a recent Court of Appeals decision regarding Minnesota’s Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA). A24-1486, 2025 WL 1287932, at *1 — N.W.3d — (Minn. Ct. App. May 5, 2025). As the first published opinion interpreting UPEPA, Cook will be a key resource for individuals and businesses defending defamation and privacy claims in Minnesota. And, on a cautionary note, Minnesota litigators should be aware of Cook’s holding that attorneys are not automatically immune from liability for disclosing settlement discussions protected by Rule 408 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence.

Background

Cook involves Minnesota’s updated Anti-SLAPP statute — UPEPA — which went into effect last year. “SLAPP” is an acronym for “Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation,” and generally refers to a baseless defamation or privacy lawsuit intended to chill speech on matters of public concern. Anti-SLAPP statutes are intended to provide SLAPP defendants a procedural mechanism to obtain an early dismissal of such a lawsuit.

Minnesota’s prior Anti-SLAPP statute, however, had been ruled unconstitutional in Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minnesota, 895 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. 2017), and therefore did not deter SLAPP suits in any meaningful way. Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, Summary of Purpose and Provisions, available here (last accessed May 14, 2025).

With Minnesota’s adoption of UPEPA in 2024, SLAPP defendants can now file a special motion to dismiss that allows them to recover their attorneys’ fees. Minn. Stat. § 554.16. Moreover, UPEPA allows SLAPP defendants to file an expedited appeal if their special motion to dismiss is denied. Minn. Stat. § 554.15. The Court of Appeals’ decision in Cook is the first published opinion resolving such an appeal.

Cook v. Trimble

District Court Proceedings

In this case, Dalvin Cook — a former Minnesota Vikings player — sued Gracelyn Trimble and her attorneys for statements they made to the media and in court filings regarding a previous lawsuit by Trimble against Cook. Cook alleged that: (1) the defendants falsely told the media that Cook had physically abused Trimble (the Media Statements), and (2) the defendants disclosed the details of Cook’s settlement offers in court filings (the Court Filings). Cook alleged defamation in response to the Media Statements. Cook alleged both defamation and invasion of privacy in response to the Court Filings.

The defendants filed a special motion to dismiss under UPEPA, arguing in part that Cook’s claims were barred by preexisting legal doctrines: The judicial-proceedings privilege and attorney immunity. Under the judicial-proceedings privilege, even a defamatory statement cannot give rise to liability if it is “(1) made by a judge, judicial officer, attorney, or witness; (2) made at a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding; and (3) . . . relevant to the subject matter of the litigation.” Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard, 729 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Minn. 2007). Attorney immunity is similar but distinct: “[A]n attorney acting within the scope of his employment as attorney is immune from liability to third persons for actions arising out of that professional relationship.” McDonald v. Stewart, 182 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Minn. 1970). In other words, the defendants argued that their statements could not give rise to liability because they were made in connection with Trimble’s prior suit against Cook.

In addition, the defendants argued that Cook did not prove actual malice. When a public figure like Cook alleges defamation, he must show that the defendants made the statement with “actual malice,” meaning that it was “made with the knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Maethner v. Someplace Safe, Inc., 929 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Minn. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court denied the defendants’ special motion to dismiss, so they filed an expedited appeal under Minn. Stat. § 554.15.

Appellate Proceedings

As a preliminary matter, the Court of Appeals noted that this was its first UPEPA appeal, which required it to determine the proper standard of review. 2025 WL 1287932, at *3. Relying on cases from other jurisdictions, the Court concluded that its review is de novo. Id. Applying that standard, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Media Statements. The Court of Appeals held that the judicial-proceedings privilege did not protect the Media Statements because they were “not an integral part of the proceeding or necessary to preserve the attorneys’ client’s rights in the proceeding.” 2025 WL 1287932, at *6 (quoting Chafoulias v. Peterson, No. C2-01-1617, 2003 WL 23025097 (Minn. App. Dec. 30, 2003) (cleaned up)). Nonetheless, the Court agreed that Cook failed to demonstrate actual malice, noting that the prior suit “presented a classic he-said-she-said dispute” from which no reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants made their statements with actual knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at *8–9. It reversed the district court on this issue.

Court Filings. The Court of Appeals held that the judicial-proceedings privilege protects the Court Filings, noting that they “may be the quintessential example of statements falling within the protections of the judicial-proceedings privilege.” 2025 WL 1287932, at *7. However, the Court went on to explain that this privilege protects against only defamation claims — not privacy claims. Id. at *9. The Court therefore held that the defamation claim arising from the Court Filings should have been dismissed but agreed with the district court that the privacy claim could move forward. As for attorney immunity, the Court of Appeals found a question of fact as to whether an exception applied, presumably requiring resolution at trial.

Analysis

Cook will be heavily cited for both its procedural and substantive holdings.

On procedure, Cook not only establishes the standard of review for UPEPA appeals, but it also reaffirms that non-Minnesota precedent is persuasive in interpreting uniform acts such as UPEPA. This latter proposition was already established by statute, see Minn. Stat. § 645.22; however, given the relative dearth of published decisions from the Minnesota Court of Appeals, practitioners will likely cite Cook for this proposition as well.

On substance, Cook breaks new ground in two ways.

First, the Court’s conclusion that the judicial-proceedings privilege protects against only defamation claims was not necessarily compelled by existing precedent. In reaching that conclusion, Cook analyzed whether the privacy claim “sound[ed] in defamation,” citing the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard, 729 N.W.2d 302, 309 (Minn. 2007).

In Mahoney, the plaintiff asserted what was essentially a “false light” invasion of privacy claim, alleging that the defendant “placed the [plaintiff] in a false and defaming position in the public.” Compare id. at 310 (cleaned up), with W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §117, at 863 (5th ed. 1984) (describing false light publicity). The Court in Mahoney concluded that a false light publicity claim sounds in defamation and is therefore barred by the judicial-proceedings privilege. 729 N.W.2d at 310. Having reached that conclusion, Mahoney did “not reach the question of whether [the judicial-proceedings] privilege applies to claims not sounding in defamation.” Id.

By contrast, Cook addresses a different strain of privacy tort — “Publication of private facts.” Compare Cook, 2025 WL 1287932 at *9, with Prosser and Keeton §117, at 856 (describing “Public Disclosure of Private Facts” as a separate privacy tort). And while Mahoney expressly did “not reach the question” of whether the privilege could cover “claims not sounding in defamation,” Cook concludes that this strain of privacy tort is not covered by the privilege precisely because it does not “sound in defamation.” 2025 WL 1287932 at *9.

In other words, Cook answers the question that Mahoney left open: Privacy claims may be barred by the judicial-proceedings privilege when they allege false light publicity, but not when they allege publication of private facts. If the Minnesota Supreme Court does not accept review, the Court of Appeals’ decision will be the authority on this issue.

Second, Cook suggests that attorneys themselves may be liable for publicly disclosing Rule 408 settlement discussion in court filings. However, the Court was careful to note that attorney immunity did not bar the claim “as a matter of law,” which suggests that attorney immunity may apply in some circumstances. 2025 WL 1287932 at *10. Namely, unless the plaintiff can prove that the attorney engaged in fraud or unlawful conduct, Cook suggests that immunity will apply. Id. But because summary judgment is generally not appropriate in these instances, see id., attorney-defendants will generally be forced to vindicate their immunity at trial.

Conclusion

Cook has important ramifications for UPEPA, the judicial-proceedings privilege, and attorney immunity. The parties in this case have until June 4, 2025, to file a petition for review before the Minnesota Supreme Court.

For more information, contact Erik Money.